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The Pacific War Begins
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident
During
the night of July 7, 1937, a small detachment of Japanese troops were
on maneuvers at Marco Polo Bridge, just a few miles outside of Beijing
.... when some shots were fired. This might easily have remained a
relatively insignificant incident, except that due to the recent
formation
of the United Front [between the Nationalists and the Communists] and
Chiang Kai-shek’s new determination to resist further Japanese
aggression, Nationalist China responded by reinforcing its troops in
the Beijing area. The Japanese also sent reinforcements, and by July 25
full-scale war had erupted.
Based
on the ease with which a small number of Japanese soldiers had earlier
overrun Manchuria, and widespread Japanese contempt for
warlord China, the Japanese anticipated a quick victory. The war
minister assured the Showa Emperor that this China incident would be
over in a month, and in July 1937 the Japanese cabinet authorized
operations for only three divisions for three months. Although Chinese
Nationalist armies did put up surprisingly stiff resistance, especially
in the Shanghai area, by December 13 the Nationalist capital at Nanjing
had fallen to the Japanese. (HEA, 311)

In
a major military and strategic gamble, Chiang
Kai-shek decided to deflect the Japanese from their campaign in
north China by launching an attack on their forces in the Shanghai
area. It
was here that Chiang had the bulk of his best German-trained divisions,
primed for action since the Communists had been forced out of the
Jiangxi Soviet onto the Long March. His forces outnumbered the Japanese
in Shanghai by more than 10 to 1, and he had taken the precaution of
constructing — again with German advice — a protective line of
concrete blockhouses in the area of Wuxi on the railroad to Nanjing,
should retreat become necessary.
On August 14, Chiang
Kai-shek ordered his air
force to bomb the Japanese warships at anchor off the docks of
Shanghai. If he had hoped that this would be a triumphal revenge for
the humiliating destruction by the Japanese navy of the Qing forces at Weihaiwei in 1895, he was sadly
disappointed. Not only had the
Nationalist air force lost the element of surprise when the Japanese
intercepted and decoded a secret telegram, but the Chinese planes
bombed inaccurately and ineffectively, missing the Japanese fleet and
instead hitting the city of Shanghai, killing hundreds of civilians.
Despite this tragic fiasco, the commanding Japanese admiral announced
that “the imperial navy, having borne the unbearable, is now
compelled to take every possible and effective measure.” Prince
Konoe [the Japanese Prime Minister] declared that Japan was now
“forced to resort to resolute action to bring sense to the
Nanjing government.” (The Search for Modern China,
400)
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As
the Japanese bombarded the city with leaflets promising decent
treatment of all civilians remaining there, skeptical Chinese
troops — fugitives from the Shanghai fighting — killed and
robbed the people of Nanjing to obtain civilian clothing and make good
their escape. On December 12 Tang
[Shengzhi, commander of the Chinese troops] himself abandoned the city;
since he
had vowed publicly to defend Nanjing to the last breath, he made no
plans for the orderly evacuation of the garrison troops there, and his
departure worsened the military confusion.
There
followed in Nanjing a period of terror and destruction
that must rank among the worst in the history of modern warfare. For
almost seven weeks the Japanese troops, who first entered the city on
December 13, unleashed on the defeated Chinese troops and on the
helpless Chinese civilian population a nearly unparalleled storm of
violence and cruelty
that has become known as the “Rape of Nanjing.” The number of women who
were raped, many of whom died after repeated assaults, was estimated by
foreign observers living in
Nanjing at 20,000; the fugitive soldiers killed were estimated at
30,000; murdered civilians at 12,000. Other contemporary
estimates made by Chinese observers were as much as ten times higher,
and it is difficult to
establish exact figures. Certainly robbery, wanton destruction, and
arson left much of the city in ruins, and piles of dead bodies were
observable in countless locations. (The Search for Modern China,
401-2)
Currently,
the most reliable and widely agreed upon figures place the massacre
victims within Nanjing City Walls to be around
50,000, mostly massacred in the first five days from December 13, 1937;
while the total victims massacred as of the end of March 1938 in both
Nanjing and its surrounding six rural counties far exceed 100,000 but
fall short of 200,000.[1]
Hence, depending on the timeframe and the geographic scope, an
empirically verifiable, scholarly valid victimization range is from
over 40,000 to under 200,000.[1]
(Wikipedia/Death Toll of the Nanjing Massacre)
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A
Contest to Cut Down 100 People
[Nov.
29th, Correspondents Asami, Mitsumoto and Yasuda reporting from
Changzhou] ... In the Katagiri unit standing in the front line,
two young officers have undertaken a contest to kill 100 people with
their swords.
Since
leaving Wuxi, one of them has already cut down 56 people, and the
other, 25 people. The former is Toyama Battalion’s 2nd
Lt. Toshiaki Mukai (26) from Jindai, Kuga County, Yamaguchi Prefecture.
The latter, in the same battalion, is 2nd
Lt. Tsuyoshi Noda (25), from Tashiro, Kimotsuki County, Kagoshima
Prefecture. While 2nd Lt. Mukai, a 3rd dan in
jukendo, takes pride in the “Seki no Magoroku” sword on his hip, 2nd
Lt. Noda talks of his sword, of a no-name brand, but a family treasure
handed down from his ancestors.
It
was decided that after leaving Wuxi, 2nd
Lt. Mukai and his group would advance along the railroad for 26 or 27
km, and 2nd
Lt. Noda’s group would advance parallel to the railroad, so the two of
them were temporarily separated. The morning after they had departed, 2nd
Lt. Noda charged into a pillbox in an unnamed village 8 km outside Wuxi
and cut down four enemies in his bid to become the first to breach the
enemy line. Hearing about this, 2nd
Lt. Mukai worked up his resolve, and that night, he and his men rushed
into an enemy camp in Henglin, where he cut down 55 people.
After
that, 2nd
Lt. Noda cut down nine people in Henglin, six people in Weiguan, and on
the 29th, six people at Changzhou station, for a total of 25. 2nd
Lt. Mukai subsequently cut down four people near the station, and when
we reporters arrived, we happened to catch the two men being
interviewed in front of the station.
Second
Lieutenant Mukai: “As it stands now, I’ll probably have cut down 100
people by the time I reach Danyang, let alone Nanjing. Noda’s gonna
lose. I’ve already cut down 56 people with my sword, and it’s only got
one little nick in it.”
Second Lieutenant
Noda: “The both of us have decided not to cut down people who are
running away. I’m an [aide-de-camp], so I can’t get my numbers up. But
before we get to Danyang, I’ll try to set a big record.” (Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, Nov. 30, 1937)
The
Contest to Cut Down 100 People
Mukai 106,
Noda 105
[December 12th, Correspondents Asami and
Suzuki reporting from the foot of Purple Mountain] Toshiaki Mukai and Tsuyochi [sic] Noda, the
two daring second lieutenants in the Katagiri Regiment who started an
unusual contest to “cut down 100 people” before entering Nanjing, have
— amidst the chaos of the battle to capture Purple Mountain on Dec.
10th — recorded their 106th and 105th kills respectively. When
they met each other at noon on Dec. 10th, they were both carrying their
swords in one hand. Their blades had, of course, been damaged.
Noda: “Hey, I got 105. What about you?” Mukai: “I got 106!” … Both men laughed.
Because they didn’t know who had reached 100 kills first, in the end
someone said, “Well then, since it’s a drawn game, what if we start
again, this time going for 150 kills?” They both agreed, and on the
11th, they started an even longer contest to cut down 150 people. At
noon on the 11th, on Purple Mountain, which overlooks an imperial tomb,
while in the midst of hunting down the remnants of the defeated
[Chinese] army, 2nd Lt. Mukai talked about the progress of the
drawn game.
“I’m happy that
we both exceeded 100 kills before we found out the final score. But I damaged my ‘Seki no Magoroku’ on some
guy’s helmet when I was cleaving him in two. So, I’ve made a promise to present this sword to
your company when I’ve finished
fighting. At 3 AM, on the morning of the 11th,
our comrades used the unusual strategy of setting Purple Mountain on
fire, in order to smoke any remaining enemies out of their hiding
places. But I got smoked out too! I shot up with my sword over my
shoulder, and stood straight as an arrow amidst a rain of bullets, but
not a single bullet hit me. That’s also thanks to my Seki no Magoroku
here.”
Then, amidst a barrage of incoming enemy bullets, he showed one of the reporters his Magoroku,
which had soaked up the blood of 106 people. (Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun,
Dec. 13, 1937)
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Retreat
to Chungking
As the Japanese advanced yet farther west to the
ancient capital of Kaifeng, which would win them control of the crucial
railroad leading south to Wuhan, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his engineers
to blow up the dikes of the Yellow River. The ensuing giant flood
stalled the Japanese for three months, destroyed more than 4,000 north
China villages, and killed unknown number of local peasants. ...
Nationalist
forces flood the Yellow River to slow the Japanese
By the
late summer of 1938, however, the Japanese had assembled the planes,
tanks, and artillery needed for the final assault on the tricity area
of Wuhan ... [and] by late October 1938 much of Wuhan was in ruins. ...
The
Japanese took over the ravaged area on October 25, 1938, having
(according to Chinese estimates) sustained 200,000 casualties and lost
more than 100 planes. Only four days before, Japanese marine and naval
units had landed and seized Canton. Chiang Kai-shek had now lost de facto
control over the whole swathe of eastern China stretching from the
passes at Shanhaiguan to the rich ports in the semitropical south,
along with all the wealthy commercial and industrial cities lying in
between. The area encompassed the most fertile of China’s
farmland and the ancient cultural heartland of the country. (SMC, 402-3)
Although
it took somewhat longer than originally anticipated, the Japanese did
swiftly capture most of the major Chinese coastal cities and the
principal agricultural plains of eastern China. But, from Nanjing, the
Nationalist
Chinese capital merely retreated farther up the line of the Yangzi
River, finally settling in the city of Chongqing (English:
Chungking), in Sichuan Province. Sichuan is a vast natural fortress
protected by
steep encircling mountains. Despite sustained Japanese aerial bombing
of Chongqing, the Chinese Nationalists continued to resist and
stubbornly
refused to surrender.
Although the Japanese won
repeated battlefield victories, they were unable to
inflict a decisive defeat on Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China. To
the end of World War II, the Japanese found it necessary to continue to
station about half of all their total available forces in China, yet
even that was not enough to achieve conclusive victory. But, after the
Japanese offensive stalled, Chiang Kai-shek’s ability to
launch a counteroffensive was also seriously limited. ...
Nationalist
China’s loss of the developed modern sector of its economy, which had
been almost exclusively confined to the large coastal cities,
especially Shanghai, and which had been the government’s principal
source of tax revenue before the war, led the Nationalist government to
issue mountains of poorly backed paper money. This resulted in
catastrophic hyperinflation. Between 1937 and 1945, average prices in
Nationalist China increased by more than two-thousand-fold. In the end,
it has been suggested that “inflation did more than any other single
issue to undermine public confidence” in the Nationalist government and
cause it to eventually lose control of mainland China. (HEA, 311-2)
The
huge costs of waging war on a continental scale in China, especially
when combined with Japan’s strategic ambition to simultaneously gear up
quickly for military self-sufficiency, drove Japan from a surprisingly
robust export-led recovery from the Great Depression in the early 1930s
to what would turn out to be a fatal dependency on heavy industrial
imports by the end of the decade. Increased military spending after
1936 led to inflation, which raised the cost of Japanese products and
made them less competitive as exports. Government controls over
imported raw materials favored those with military applications rather
than materials such as cotton that could be used to manufacture
textiles for reexport. Government control also funneled new investments
into war industries rather than consumer or export-oriented business.
As a direct result of Japan’s
quest for self-sufficiency, ironically, Japan
only became more critically dependent on imports of such things as
machine tools, iron, and oil. (HEA, 313-4)
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Going to war against Japan’s own largest supplier
of vital
war materials (the United States) hardly seemed sensible, especially
since the United States was also much more populous and more
extensively industrialized than Japan as of 1941. But Japan had few
options. By late 1941, Japan’s stockpiles of oil were dwindling
alarmingly, while the United States was already beginning a massive
military buildup. If Japan was to have any chance of winning a war
with the United States, it would have to begin soon. Some leaders in
the Japanese army were, moreover, confident that Japanese fighting
spirit would overcome the material disadvantages. At an imperial
conference on November 5, 1941, a decision was made to go to war if no
settlement had been reached by December. The imperial navy drew up
plans to temporarily paralyze U.S. forces by striking at the U.S.
Pacific Fleet based in Hawai’i. A Japanese aircraft carrier task force
sailed
for the purpose on November 26 and struck at Pearl Harbor on December
7. (HEA, 315)
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We hereby
declare war on the United States of America and the British
Empire. ... It has been truly unavoidable. ... More than four years
have
passed since China, failing to understand the true intentions of Our
Empire, disturbed the peace of Asia. ... The regime which has survived
at
Chungking, relying on American and British protection, still continues
its fratricidal opposition. ... Both America and Britain have
aggravated
the disturbances of East Asia [and] have increased military
preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have
obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce and finally have
resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, thereby gravely
menacing the existence of Our Empire. ... Our Empire has no other
recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its
path. (East Asia: A New History, 395) |
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All
of the American aircraft carriers had miraculously escaped the
slaughter
at Pearl Harbor simply by being out of port at the time of the attack.
... In June 1942, Japanese forces staged successful amphibious landings
on actual U.S. soil in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska. This was only
intended as a diversion, however, as part of an elaborate plan to lure
out and sink the remainder of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Thanks to some
good luck, and the fact that the Americans had broken the Japanese code
and were able to decipher Japanese messages, the U.S. fleet surprised
the Japanese instead. In the ensuing naval air battle of Midway Island,
beginning June 4, 1942, four Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk to
the American loss of only one. This battle of Midway became the crucial
turning point of the war in the Pacific.
Instead
of serving as an impenetrable defensive shield, Japan’s island empire
in the Pacific proved to be full of holes. U.S. submarines, sailing
deep into Japanese waters with relative impunity, almost immediately
began to wage an aggressive campaign to cut off the flow of essential
raw materials from Java, and elsewhere, to the factories on the
Japanese home islands. As a result, Japan’s industrial economy ground
to a standstill, and Japan was increasingly unable to replace the ships
and planes it lost in battle. Japanese-held islands in the Pacific that
were especially strongly fortified were simply
bypassed, or skipped over, in the Allied counteroffensive, in a process
called “island hopping.” (HEA, 315-7)
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Ending the War
In
November 1944, air raids on the Japanese home islands began with
long-range B-29 bombers based in the Marianas. Altogether, some
sixty-six Japanese cities were reduced to ashes. Incendiary
bombs ignited raging conflagrations among the mostly wooden Japanese
houses. Of Japan’s major cities, only the ancient imperial capital of
Kyoto was spared. Before long, Allied aircraft enjoyed almost complete
command of the air above Japan. Yet the unconditional surrender demand
that had been adopted by the Allies at the Casablanca conference in
1943 remained unacceptable to Japanese authorities. ...
On
August 6, a B-29 dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. On
August 8, the
Soviet Union unleashed a massive assault on Japanese forces in
Manchuria. On August 9, a second atomic bomb was exploded over
Nagasaki.
Even then, on August 10, the Japanese government still broadcast a
message indicating that Japan would be willing to accept Allied
surrender terms only if the preservation of the emperor could be
guaranteed. The U.S. response, approved by both Britain and the Soviet
Union, was to agree, but with the crucial modification that “the
authority of the Emperor ... shall be subject to the Supreme Commander
of the Allied Powers.” (HEA, 317-8)
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