
[The
Song founder] Emperor Taizu was acutely aware of the fragmentation
that had been caused by warlordism since the middle of the Tang
Dynasty, and of the frequency of military coups like the one that had
brought himself to power ... [and as a result] he was determined to
clearly
separate the military from civilian administration. Emperor Taizu
hosted a legendary palace banquet for his senior generals at which,
with a toast, he relieved them of their military commands and retired
them to lives of civilian comfort in the capital. ... [These] policies
would prove successful enough that dynastic change thereafter would be
very much less frequent and would never again be the result of an
internal military coup. Although there were many dynasties in
premodern Chinese history, only three of them came after the Song
(including the period of Mongol rule, but not
counting other peripheral non-Han regimes that sometimes extended
deeply into Chinese
territory). Each of the relatively few remaining changes of dynasty,
furthermore, can be attributed to foreign invasion. The premodern
Chinese sociopolitical order became rather remarkably stable in the
nearly 1,000 years after the Song Dynasty began in 960 — but the
flip side of this same coin was also a long-term decline in the
prestige of military service and relative military weakness. China
would thereafter repeatedly be threatened with foreign conquest. (HEA, 136-7)The paradox of the Song Dynasty is that, although it was a time when China led the world in technology, commercial prosperity, and sophisticated culture and the arts — and a time when China may have held a third of the world’s total population — yet even after the Song reunification was complete (by about 978), it was still a somewhat diminished, militarily more vulnerable China. The loss of control over Inner Asian borderlands not only made the Song a geographically smaller empire, but also deprived it of horses and effective cavalry from the northern borderlands (cavalry that was, furthermore, less expensive than regular imperial garrisons because it was composed of self-sustaining pastoral nomads accustomed to living off the steppes). This forced the Song to spend more of its revenue on the military than the Tang Dynasty had, even as the Song was also militarily weaker. (HEA, 137) ![]() Compounding
the paradox of a militarily weak Song Dynasty that nonetheless managed
to flourish culturally and economically, after the loss of the north in
1127, the geographically much diminished Southern Song in some respects
may have actually even entered the most flourishing phase of the whole
dynasty. Although the land area controlled by the Song had shrunk
dramatically, the Southern Song was the period when what has been
called China’s “medieval economic revolution” reached its climax. (HEA, 140)
Song
Dynasty Chinese society was commercialized, technologically
sophisticated, and urban. The city-dwelling population of Song China
may have even been equal to the entire urban population of the whole
rest of the world at the time. It was not uncommon for wealthy
merchants to combine their capital for fixed periods of investment,
credit was available on commission from local brokers, and even futures
contracts with commissioned agents were already being signed.
Commercialization had become so pervasive that market forces determined
even such activities as the sale of concubines (secondary wives) and
religious behavior. For example, it was now normal to hire different
types of religious professionals to perform different specific
religious services, as a kind of market transaction, and to abandon any
god who did not appear able to deliver tangible blessings. Coal-fired
blast furnaces were producing iron in quantities that may have peaked
in the eleventh century at levels nearly equal to the whole of Europe
as late as 1700. Gunpowder was put to at least limited
military application, for example, as an igniter for naphtha-based
flame throwers. Paper money — which had first appeared in late Tang —
was in wide circulation, and the technology of woodblock printing was
promoting a revolution in the availability of books.
(HEA, 141)
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(note: Gutenberg did not invent his printing press until 1440) ![]() ![]() Song dynasty jiaozi: the world’s earliest paper money (1023 CE) ![]() ![]() The compass was invented in the early Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) and then adopted for naval use in the Song dynasty
The
increased availability of books may have also contributed to a major
social transformation. In late imperial China, beginning with the Song,
although there certainly were other ways of becoming wealthy, there was
to a large extent only one true elite career path: that of the
scholar-official, or mandarin. The word mandarin
is English, not Chinese. It is derived from Portuguese (and ultimately
Sanskrit), but it is nonetheless used to describe a very uniquely
Chinese sociopolitical class. In China there was nothing
new about an association between elite status, education, and a career
in
government, but the late imperial mandarins now — unlike their ancient
predecessors — usually held office on the strength of academic
degrees obtained through anonymously graded written tests. The
hereditary Great Families that had dominated China through most of the
Tang Dynasty were sweepingly annihilated by a devastating rebellion
that began in 873 and replaced by a new merit-based sociopolitical
order. The Chinese
imperial civil service examination system finally came of age in the
Song dynasty. ... For better or for worse, the examination system helped shape the kind of society late imperial China became. To a remarkable degree, it was a society focused on education and book learning. The elite were scholars. According to Confucian notions of rule by moral example, government itself is essentially an act of educating people to improve themselves. Confucius is regarded as China’s first teacher. The examination system never really permitted as much upward social mobility as is sometimes imagined by enthusiasts. True rags-to-riches cases were rare, and a large stratum of relatively wealthy families produced most degree holders. The system also did not reward technological or scientific innovation. But by any premodern standard, this was a relatively fluid meritocratic social order, with elite status not directly hereditary and opportunities for advancement through ability and effort clearly visible (if not always actually attainable). The examination system provided at least the appearance of fairness of opportunity. And, the examination system also ensured that China’s elite were extremely well educated and steeped in common Confucian values. This helps explain why late imperial Chinese society was exceptionally stable. (HEA, 142-3) The
Mongols conquered the largest contiguous land empire in the history of
the world.
In the west, they overran parts of Poland and Hungary and pushed as far
as the Adriatic Sea. Baghdad fell to the Mongols in 1258. In the south,
they raided into India, although
they did not then attempt to occupy it. In the northeast, the Mongols
won the submission of Korea. Two huge amphibious invasions of
the
Japanese islands were both scattered by typhoons and defeated, however,
and repeated strikes southeast into the region of
Vietnam became mired in tropical jungles and fierce resistance. Even
the Mongol Empire eventually reached its limits. While the Mongol
conquests were still accumulating, meanwhile, Chinggis Khan’s grandson,
Khubilai Khan (1215-1294), was proclaimed Great Khan in 1260 and began
to consolidate a
semi-Chinese-style Yuan Dynasty based at Beijing, in the east. ...Despite Mongol power and influence, however, the Yuan Dynasty did not prove very enduring. By the time Khubilai Khan had completed his conquest of the Southern Song in 1279 he was already in his late sixties. This was old by the standards of the day, and his final years were dogged by failures. Khubilai Khan, for example, attempted to impose a new universal writing system, based on Tibetan, which simply failed to win acceptance. His two invasions of Japan were disasters. In 1294, he died. Within a few years after his death, the Mongol empire in China began to tear itself apart amid succession disputes — a common feature of steppe history. Although the steppe tradition was that leadership should be hereditary within a single family, there were no fixed rules for selection within the family. Descent could just as easily pass from older brother to younger brother, or from father to younger son, as from father to eldest son. The result was that when a khan died, it was normal for there to be a power struggle. In addition, and catastrophically, the bubonic plague (or something like it — the identification of this disease remains controversial) also made its appearance in the Mongol-ruled Yuan Empire sometime around the 1320s. From there, the plague may have spread along the newly established transcontinental Mongol trade routes to the Mediterranean and Europe, where the resulting Black Death had a major impact on medieval European history. In China, it has been estimated that as much as a third of the entire population may have perished. For many, it seemed as if the end of the world was at hand. (HEA, 148-51)
1368-1644
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